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FOREWORD
Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
United States has been struggling with the issue of how
to redefine its defense requirements. Although the Cold
War competition with the former Soviet Union was
perilous and extremely costly in human and material
resources, this competition did represent an agreed and
certain framework around which to focus U.S. defense
strategy and structure U.S. armed forces. The
uncertainty of the post-Cold War world has left defense
planners and analysts debating the proper force
planning methodology to pursue, and opened a broader
debate concerning the size and purpose of the U.S.
military establishment. Four separate reviews have been
conducted in the past 7 years: the Base Force, the
Bottom Up Review, the Commission on Roles and Missions,
and, most recently, the Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR). These reviews have generated only a moderate
degree of consensus within the Defense Department and
much less agreement in the broader national security
community.
In this monograph, Colonel John F. Troxell first
asserts that there is a false dichotomy being drawn
between capabilities-based and threat-based force
planning. He argues that post-Cold War force planning
must be founded on a logical integration of threat- and
capabilities-based planning methodologies. He then
addresses the issue of the two Major Regional
Contingency (MRC) force-sizing paradigm. After
reviewing all the arguments made against that paradigm,
Colonel Troxell concludes that in a world characterized
by uncertainty and regional instability, in which the
United States has global security interests and a
unique leadership role, the two MRC framework
constitutes a logical scheme for organizing U.S.
defense planning efforts.
That framework is also flexible enough to
accommodate adjustments to the U.S. defense
establishment, both today and for the immediate future.
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New approaches to planning scenarios and the
operational concept for employing forces offer the
potential for such adjustments concerning the "ways" of
the strategic paradigm, while force thinning and
modernization are two important categories for
adjusting the affordability of the strategic "means."
At some point, changes in the international
security environment will demand significantly
different approaches to shaping U.S. forces. But, given
the QDR's ringing endorsement of the two MRC construct,
that change will be a 21st, rather than a 20th, century
undertaking.
RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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FORCE PLANNING IN AN ERA OF UNCERTAINTY:
TWO MRCs AS A FORCE SIZING FRAMEWORK
Ever since the end of the Cold War, the United
States has been struggling to answer the question, "How
much is enough?" concerning the size of its military
establishment. This is the principal topic of the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the National
Defense Panel's (NDP) Alternative Force Structure
Assessment. Most defense analysts would claim that
during the Cold War the task was relatively simple. The
threat posed by the Soviet Union required the fielding
of forces capable of conducting a global war, with
priority placed on defending the plains of Western
Europe. This situation served as an agreed scenario
around which to design and develop forces and measure
risks if specific force goals were not met. In
addition, the Cold War force was large enough that all
other military requirements, such as forces for forward
presence, smaller scale interventions, and humanitarian
operations could be met as lesser-included
requirements. Although the threat to U.S. interests by
a competing global power has vanished, the United
States retains global interests in a far from benign
world.
During the post-Cold War period, the sizing
function that replaced the global war scenario has been
the requirement to prosecute two major regional
contingencies (MRCs).1 This requirement evolved during
the last years of the Bush administration as the
rationale for the Base Force. The first act of the new
Clinton administration was to study the issue,
producing the Bottom Up Review (BUR) Force. The Base
Force and the BUR Force were both sized against the
requirement to fight two MRCs, often incorrectly
referred to as the "two MRC strategy." This "strategy"
has generated a great deal of controversy. Depending on
the point of view, the force structure associated with
this posture is attacked for being "over-stuffed,"
unaffordable, or totally inadequate. The purpose of
this study is to clarify the role of the two MRC
requirement within the current defense program and to
propose some considerations for possible adjustments to
that requirement.

Force Planning Methodologies.
In designing forces to protect U.S. national
interests, military planners must accomplish three
tasks: determine how much force is required to protect
those interests, with a certain degree of assured
success or a minimum degree of acceptable risk;
determine how to posture that force; and, finally,
convince Congress and the public that the solutions for
the first two tasks are reasonably correct.2 The issue
of creating well-reasoned force structure requirements
and convincing cost conscious politicians is not an
inconsequential matter.
Two very different force planning methodologies
have been utilized by military planners since the
advent of the Cold War.3 The easiest to conceptualize
is threat-based planning. This methodology is
preeminent when threats to U.S. interests are easily
recognized and identified. The task for the planner is
to postulate a reasonable scenario, or the road to war,
then determine the amount of force needed to prevail in
that scenario. This approach lends itself to dynamic
and static modeling and provides a quantifiable
rationale for the recommended force structure, and
answers the question: Can the United States beat the
opponent? The logic of this approach is very compelling
and greatly facilitates accomplishing the planner's
third task, convincing the public and Congress.
The second major methodology is generally referred
to as capabilities-based planning. Somewhat harder to
conceptualize, analysts have proposed several variants
of the same basic theme. Capabilities-based planning is
most in vogue when threats to U.S. interests are
multifaceted and uncertain and do not lend themselves
to single-point scenario-based analysis. Instead of
focusing on one or more specific opponents, the planner
applies a liberal dose of military judgment to
determine the appropriate mix of required military

2

capabilities. Capabilities-based planners claim to
focus on objectives rather than scenarios. Forces are
sized either by a resource constraint emphasis (budget
driven), or by focusing on generic military missions
required to protect U.S. interests. A major problem
planners have with this approach is convincing Congress
that military judgment has established the proper
linkage between this uncertain future environment and
the specific force levels requested.4 The general
characteristics of these two methodologies are
summarized in Figure 1.
________________________________________________

Threat-based planning was the principal method
employed to size U.S. forces during the Cold War. With
the acceptance by the National Security Council of NSC
68 on April 7, 1950, the Soviet threat was clearly
recognized. In the words of Secretary of State Acheson,
the Soviet Union confronted the United States with a
"threat [which] combined the ideology of communist
doctrine and the power of the Russian state into an
aggressive expansionist drive."5 The first task for
military planners was to develop a strategic nuclear
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deterrent, both to protect survival interests and to
extend this deterrent to protect vital interests
represented by regional alliances, the most important
of which was NATO. Military planners also addressed the
need for conventional forces. In accordance with the
threat-based methodology, war in central Europe became
the dominant scenario. NATO developed a series of force
goals designed to counter a predetermined level of
Soviet forces. In the Lisbon Agreement of February
1952, for instance, the NATO ministers set a 1954 goal
of 9,000 aircraft and 90 divisions.6 President
Eisenhower, however, desired "security with solvency"
and had as one of his administration's principal goals
the cutting of the federal budget. To stabilize defense
spending, the "New Look" defense program deemphasized
conventional forces and stressed the deterrent and warfighting potential of nuclear weapons. The risk
associated with conventional force shortfalls was
ameliorated by U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons.
Limited war capabilities however, were not completely
discounted. General Maxwell Taylor, while Army Chief of
Staff, established the requirement for the Army to be
able "to close a corps of three divisions in an
overseas theater in 2 months," with the necessary
logistical backup to fight those forces.7 Force
planning in the 1950s, although firmly grounded in
threat-based analysis, also contained important
elements based on resource- (Ike's New Look) and
mission-based capabilities analysis (Taylor's corps).
The Kennedy administration discarded the "New
Look" and adopted the concept of "Flexible Response" as
the foundation of its defense policy. At the center of
"flexible response" theory was the assumption that
deterring and fighting with nonnuclear forces would
reduce the likelihood of nuclear escalation. Secretary
of Defense McNamara argued that the United States
needed a "two-and-one-half-war" conventional war
capability sufficient to mount a defense of Western
Europe against a Soviet attack; defend either Southeast
Asia or Korea against a Chinese attack; and still meet
a contingency elsewhere.8 McNamara recognized the
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challenges of conducting defense planning under
uncertainty, notably the need for defense programs to
provide capabilities that would eventually be used in
unforeseen contingencies. From this arose the concept
of rationalizing force structure in terms of the most
stressing threats (the Soviet Union and China), but
training and equipping the forces for flexibility.9
Army Chief of Staff General Wheeler claimed that "we
have created versatile and flexible general purpose
forces which can be tailored to the requirements of
emergency situations. For these purposes, the
relatively new United States Strike Command, STRICOM,
has been provided eight combat-ready Army divisions, a
commensurate amount of Tactical Air combat power, and
the necessary airlift to cope with a number of limited
war situations."10 STRICOM's mission was to provide a
general reserve of combat ready forces to reinforce
other unified commands, and to plan and conduct
contingency operations. McNamara used contingency
planning to hedge against uncertainty and reasoned that
if U.S. forces could cope with the most threatening
contingencies, they should suffice to deal with the
other unexpected challenges that might arise.11 Once
again, force planners combined elements from threatand capabilities-based planning.
A less conservative strategy was chosen by the
Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations. As National
Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger launched a
reexamination of the assumptions of the two-and-onehalf war strategy. The collapse of the Sino-Soviet bloc
and recognition that the United States had never
generated the forces required for that strategy led to
the adoption of the one-and-one-half war strategy.
President Nixon outlined the rationale in his report to
Congress in February 1970:
In the effort to harmonize doctrine and
capability, we chose what is best described
as the "1 1/2 war" strategy. Under it we will
maintain in peacetime general purpose forces
adequate for simultaneously meeting a major
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Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, .
. . and contending with a contingency
elsewhere.12
Within this more conservative framework, planning under
uncertainty was always a theme. In 1976, Secretary of
Defense James Schlesinger employed multiple planning
scenarios in his guidance to the military departments,
similar to the Illustrative Planning Scenarios of
today. The DoD Annual Report 2 years later noted that
U.S. general purpose forces "must be trained, equipped,
and supplied so that they can deploy and fight in a
wide variety of environments against a range of
possible foes."13
Flexibility in force planning was advanced further
during the Carter administration. The issue of regional
contingencies was raised, with a particular focus on
the Persian Gulf. A 1979 DoD study identified a variety
of threats and contingencies, and proposed programs to
provide broad capabilities for the region without
focusing on a single threat or scenario. This
capabilities-based effort eventually led to the
formation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force and,
still later, CENTCOM. After the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in December 1979, however, military
planners turned almost exclusively to the Soviet threat
to Iran as the likely scenario for action in the
Persian Gulf.14
During the Reagan years military planning was much
more clearly grounded in a threat-based approach based
on possible global war with the Soviet Union. The
Soviet Union appeared to be capable of aggression in
several theaters, and U.S. planning had to consider the
possibility of simultaneous wars in Southwest Asia and
Central Europe. The Office of the Secretary of Defense
adopted a force sizing scenario that postulated a
Soviet invasion of Iran as the initial event in such a
global war. This scenario raised the possibility of war
with the Soviet Union on several fronts, either because
of Soviet aggression in multiple theaters or because
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the United States might escalate "horizontally" by
conducting offensives in regions of Soviet weakness.15
Despite this possibility of multifront operations,
however, it was clear that the defense of central
Europe was the dominant case for defining military
requirements. Nevertheless, the rapid deployment force
(RDF) made continued progress during the Reagan
buildup. That the purpose and framework of this force
were anchored in capabilities-based planning was
illustrated in the 1984 DoD Annual Report:
. . . we need a "rapid deployment capability"
primarily for those areas of the world in
which the U.S. has little or no nearby
military infrastructure or, in some cases,
maintains no presence at all. There are many
locations where we might need to project
force, not only in SWA and the Middle East,
but also in Africa, Central America, South
America, the Caribbean, and elsewhere. Each
of these areas has special requirements, but
it would be too costly to try to tailor a
unique force for each. Therefore we must set
priorities . . . and, at the same time, build
flexible capabilities that can serve our
needs in more than one region.16
Force planning during the Reagan years, and indeed
for all administrations during the Cold War, was
threat-based but not to the exclusion of important
contributions derived from the capabilities-based
approach. "Threat analysis was an important variable in
the strategy development process," one Rand analyst
concludes in this regard, "but it was far from the only
factor, or even the most important."17 During the
entire period, Secretaries of Defense were consistently
concerned with planning under uncertain conditions and
thus made regional distinctions and considered
contingencies other than the standard Soviet attack on
Central Europe.18 In addition, U.S. Cold War force
structure was generally large and diverse enough to
respond to numerous lesser-included contingencies.19 In
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the end, the combination of force planning methods
worked well for the United States in the Cold War. But,
as Figure 2 demonstrates, it was the threat-based
foundation that primarily contributed to the widespread
political support for decades of high defense spending.

The basis for U.S. Cold War planning was
dramatically swept away in only a few years as a result
of two revolutions in the Soviet Union. The first
occurred when President Gorbachev announced to the
United Nations in December 1988 that he would withdraw
some troops from Eastern Europe. This revolution ended
in November 1989 when the Berlin Wall fell, signaling
the end of the Warsaw Pact and the end of Moscow's
domination of Eastern Europe. The second revolution
began in August 1991, with the attempted coup in
Moscow. The failed attempt by communist hard-liners to
turn back the clock led to accelerated change and the
demise of the Soviet Union.20
These revolutions changed the strategic
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environment in four critical areas. First, the Soviet
collapse eliminated much of the stabilizing structure
of the bipolar Cold War world. Stability was also
lessened by the loss of the predictable and
constraining emphasis on nuclear deterrence between the
superpowers. Second, loss of stability imposed by the
bipolar world accelerated the regionalization of
conflict, a process that had been underway for some
time.21 "In a new era, some Third World conflicts may
no longer take place against the backdrop of superpower
competition. . . . The erosion of U.S.-Soviet
bipolarity could permit, and in some ways encourage,
the growth of these challenges."22 Added to this are
the unprecedented levels and quality of arms found in
regional conflict areas, coupled with the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
means, all of which virtually ensure that U.S. global
security interests will be threatened.23 Finally, the
demise of the Soviet Union engendered a public demand
for a sizable peace dividend. As a consequence,
pressure to reduce the defense budget has had a
significant impact on force planning. An explicit
objective of the defense program presented by the
Clinton administration is to meet American security
needs while reducing the overall level of resources
devoted to defense.24 Political interest in eliminating
the budget deficit by 2002 will continue to put
pressure on the defense program.
The Base Force.
In an effort to demonstrate military
responsiveness to changes in the strategic and
budgetary environments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff General Colin Powell developed the Base Force in
the early 1990s. This force was considered the minimum
force that would still allow the armed forces to meet
mission requirements with acceptable risk. The Base
Force was developed through a close-hold process by the
Program and Budget Analysis Division (PBAD) of the
Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate
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(J-8) of the Joint Staff, with little analytical
support, or formal input, from the Services or the
CINCs. The suspension of the JSR process and the
development of the Base Force are manifestations of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, and dramatically demonstrate the
shifting focus of the force planning process from the
Services to the Joint Staff.25
The Base Force straddled both the Soviet
revolutions of 1988 and 1991, causing the justification
and rationale behind the chosen force levels to evolve
over time. The initial focus of the Base Force was on a
capabilities-based approach to defense planning, driven
largely by resource constraints. As a result, the J-5
was given the task of determining:
. . . whether J-8's resource-driven force
structure and the Chairman's recommended
force posture provided the capability to
pursue US objectives. Thus he was to validate
from a strategic perspective the force
structure that the J-8 had already validated
from a programming and budgetary
perspective.26
The threat was very ill-defined at this point.
"I'm running out of demons," General Powell commented
in April 1991, " I'm running out of villains. . . . I'm
down to Castro and Kim Il Sung."27 In such an
environment, Powell stressed, there were some very real
limitations to threat-oriented contingency analysis.
The resource-constrained force, he concluded, should
instead focus on the combat capabilities needed to
ensure that a sufficient array of assets would be
present to perform the multiple missions demanded on
the modern battlefield.28 The mission-focused aspect of
the Base Force was evident in the three conceptual
conventional force packages that eventually became part
of the 1992 National Military Strategy (NMS) (Figure
3). Forces for the Atlantic would include forward based
and forward deployed units committed to Europe, and
heavy reinforcing forces for Europe, the Middle East,
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and the Persian Gulf based in the United States. The
Pacific Forces differed from the Atlantic package,
reflecting the maritime character of the area.
Contingency Forces would consist of U.S. based ground,
air, and naval forces capable of worldwide deployment
as needed.29

Unfortunately, the demand of Operations DESERT
SHIELD and DESERT STORM precluded the Pentagon's
strategic planners from completing the analytical
construct behind the Base Force, a task that
Representative Les Aspin was more than willing to
undertake. In the first of two national security
papers, Aspin attacked capabilities-based force
planning, charging that decisions concerning what
capabilities are required of U.S. forces could not be
done in a vacuum. Instead, he concluded, ". . . it is
critical to identify threats to U.S. interests that are
sufficiently important that Americans would consider
the use of force to secure them."30 Shortly thereafter,
Aspin outlined in a second paper, his concept of the
"Iraqi equivalent" as the generic threat measure for
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regional aggressors and the "Desert Storm equivalent"
as the most robust building block for U.S. forces. The
purpose was to establish a clear linkage between the
force structure and the sorts of threats the forces
could be expected to deal with. Aspin also envisioned
his "threat-driven" methodology to be flexible enough
to include aspects of a typical capabilities-based
approach. The building blocks for the methodology, he
pointed out, were generic capabilities.
Although each is informed by a careful review
of pertinent historical cases, I am not
suggesting we acquire forces which would be
suited only to a few places and precedents.
I'm suggesting instead generic military
capabilities which should be effective
against the full spectrum of categorical
threats in the uncertain future.31
At the same time, within the Pentagon, the
rationale for the Base Force evolved into a combined
capabilities-based and threat-based approach and became
firmly anchored to the two MRC requirement. In late
1992, General Powell began promoting the Base Force as
both capabilities oriented as well as threat oriented.
In a few cases such as Korea and Southwest Asia, he
pointed out, it was possible to identify particular
threats with some degree of certainty.32 These
developments had no effect on the regional focus of the
force. In 1992, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney
reported that, "the ability to respond to regional and
local crises is a key element of our new strategy."33
And the "Base Force" NMS of 1992 stated that, U.S.
"plans and resources are primarily focused on deterring
and fighting regional rather than global wars."34
Although neither of these documents specified a two MRC
requirement, behind the scenes the sizing function for
this requirement continued to evolve. Both the 1991 and
1992 Joint Military Net Assessments (JMNAs) focused on
the warfighting analysis for Major Regional
Contingency-East (MRC-East)-Southwest Asia, and MRCWest-Korea. According to Army force planners, the
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principal focus of U.S. operational planning was
"regional crisis response--to include a capability to
respond to multiple concurrent major regional
contingencies."35 In his autobiography, General Powell
clearly states what his NMS did not: "The Base Force
strategy called for armed forces capable of fighting
two major regional conflicts 'nearly
simultaneously'."36
The Bottom Up Review Force.
With a new administration, the Base Force title
was jettisoned; but the underpinnings of U.S. force
structure remained largely intact. Upon assuming
office, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin initiated a
comprehensive review of the nation's defense strategy
and force structure and published the Report of the
Bottom Up Review (BUR) in October 1993. The methodology
for the BUR combined all threat-based and capabilitiesbased aspects of the force planning methodologies. To
begin with, there was the traditional assessment of
threats and opportunities, the formulation of a
strategy to protect and advance U.S. interests, and the
determination of the forces needed to implement the
strategy. At the same time, there was the evaluation of
military missions that included fighting MRCs;
conducting smaller scale operations; maintaining
overseas presence; and deterring attacks with weapons
of mass destruction. The ultimate force sizing
criterion was to "maintain sufficient military power to
be able to win two major regional conflicts that occur
nearly simultaneously." The planning and assessment for
these MRCs were based on two illustrative scenarios
viewed as representative yardsticks with which to
assess in "gross terms the capabilities of U.S.
forces."37 From this perspective, the BUR continued the
dual focus on both threat and capabilities that had
evolved in the Base Force. "The Clinton defense
policy," Richard L. Kugler points out,
represents continuity rather than a
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revolutionary departure, for the changes it
makes are relatively small. . . . The chief
difference lies in the new policy's call for
a smaller conventional posture, but only 1015 percent smaller than the Bush
administration's Base Force.38
The BUR demonstrates that analysts who claim that
force planning is either threat-based or capabilitiesbased probably do not have much practical experience
with the task. It is clear that elements of both
approaches must be applied. This is even more the case
in periods of increased uncertainty, as demonstrated by
the Base Force and the BUR. Scenarios are extremely
useful to the force planner as a yardstick against
which to measure the capabilities of one's force.
Because they reflect key aspects of future challenges
the United States might face, well-chosen scenarios
help to ensure that the yardstick used has some
relationship to reality. It is also important to keep
in mind that no single scenario (or pair of scenarios)
will ever be completely adequate to assess force
capabilities.
Does the use of scenarios as assessment tools
constitute "threat-based planning"? That common
question can best be answered by posing another: "Is it
possible to do serious force planning without
reference, either explicitly or implicitly, to some
scenarios?" The answer to the second question is
clearly no. Any force structure must ultimately be
judged against some expected set of operational
requirements--those things that the force is expected
to be able to do. This is simply another way of saying
"scenarios."39 Nevertheless, just because scenarios are
used, the label "scenario-based" planning should not be
accepted. The central role played by objectives in
planning (capabilities-based approach) has been clearly
demonstrated. At every level--from the President's
National Security Strategy down to an individual
Service's assessment of priorities--the first step in
planning is to state explicitly what is to be
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accomplished. In addition, any useful defense planning
exercise must be completed within the context of the
anticipated budgetary resources available for defense.
The argument to integrate threat and the two types of
capability-based planning is best made by Rand analyst
Richard Kugler,
The central argument advanced here is that
mission-based capability analysis can help
gauge requirements for the U.S. conventional
posture, and help build public understanding
of why sizable forces are needed in an era
when threats to U.S. interests are unclear.
This is not to imply, however, that this
methodology should entirely replace the other
two approaches. Threat-based contingency
analysis will still be needed to examine
specific conflicts to which U.S. forces might
be committed, and resource-based capability
analysis will be needed to examine the
internal characteristics of the force
posture. The three methodologies thus are
best used in tandem, as a package of
techniques that can work together to shed
illuminating light on conventional force
needs.40
U.S. Defense Strategy.
The appropriateness of the two MRC force-sizing
function can only be judged within the context of the
nation's defense strategy. Fortunately, over the past
several years there appears to be a growing consensus
concerning the strategy's fundamental components
outlined in Figure 4. The enduring goals of the nation,
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, are
clearly articulated, as they have consistently been
throughout this period, as the objectives of the
President's National Security Strategy of Engagement
and Enlargement. The ways to achieve these ends are
succinctly encapsulated by Secretary of Defense Cohen,
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in the recently released QDR, as the "shape-respondprepare" defense strategy.

U.S. defense strategy for the near and long
term must continue to shape the strategic
environment to advance U.S. interests,
maintain the capability to respond to the
full spectrum of threats, and prepare now for
the threats and dangers of tomorrow and
beyond.41
Once again there is a great deal of consistency
here in terms of basic components. However, as Cohen
argues, priorities have been adjusted to place "greater
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emphasis on the continuing need to maintain continuous
overseas presence in order to shape the international
environment and to be better able to respond to a
variety of smaller-scale contingencies and asymmetric
threats."42 Finally, the National Military Strategy
suggests a continuing need for flexible and robust
military capabilities. Despite the increased interest
in shaping the security environment, the priority for
U.S. military capabilities ". . . is to deter and, if
necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which our most
important interests are threatened."43 The final
element of our defense strategy, the means, is anything
but settled and is the principal focus of the QDR and
follow-on work by the NDP.
Contrary to much misperception, the United States
does not have a "two MRC strategy." The U.S. defense
strategy calls for military forces to be able to
protect and advance U.S. interests by carrying out the
full range of military tasks enumerated in the NSS. In
addition to deterring and defeating hostile regional
powers (fighting MRCs), U.S. forces are needed to
provide stability via overseas presence, to deter and
prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction, and to
conduct a wide range of smaller scale contingency
operations.44
The two MRC requirement represents the sizing
function for the Clinton administration's defense
program--the principal determinant of the size and
composition of U.S. conventional forces. The nature of
this sizing function was clearly articulated by
Secretary Perry in 1996:
Previously, our force structure was planned
to deter a global war with the Soviet Union,
which we considered a threat to our very
survival as a nation. All other threats,
including regional threats, were considered
lesser-but-included cases . . . Today, the
threat of global conflict is greatly
diminished, but the danger of regional
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conflict is neither lesser nor included and
has therefore required us to take this danger
explicitly into account in structuring our
forces.45
The specific two MRC requirement states that the
principal determinant of the size and composition of
U.S. conventional forces is "the capability, in concert
with regional allies, to fight and decisively win two
MRCs that occur nearly simultaneously."46 Inherent in
the acceptance of the two MRC force-sizing requirement
is the recognition that the United States will not be
able to conduct sizable contingency operations at the
same time it is fighting in two MRCs.47 The compelling
rationale for this sizing function has been developed
during the entire post-Cold War period.
First, as a nation with global interests, the
United States wants to field a military capability to
avoid a situation in which it lacks the forces to deter
aggression in one region while fighting in another.
"With this capability," the BUR points out, "we will be
confident, and our allies as well as potential enemies
will know, that a single regional conflict will not
leave our interests and allies in other regions at
risk."48 The historical evidence in support of the two
MRC requirement is much stronger than detractors are
willing to acknowledge. There have been, for instance,
22 nearly simultaneous crises, requiring the deployment
and use of military force from 1946 to 1991.49 The
likelihood of such occurrences has increased in the
absence of the Cold War superpower restraints.
A second reason is that a force capable of
defeating two regional adversaries should provide the
basic wherewithal to support a defense against a
larger-than-expected threat from, as examples, a
continental-scale adversary such as Russia or China, or
a coalition of regional opponents.50 Although a peer
competitor is not envisioned in the near term, the
possibility of confrontations with a larger than MRC
threat must be guarded against, as demonstrated in the
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recent crisis over Taiwan. This hedge against
uncertainty is also required as a practical matter
because of the time needed to reconstitute a larger
force. "If we were to discard half of this two MRC
capability or allow it to decay," the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff concludes, "it would take many
years to rebuild a force of comparable excellence. In
today's turbulent international environment, where the
future posture of so many powerful nations remains
precarious, we could find ourselves with too little,
too late."51
Finally, the two MRC sizing function recognizes
the increased operational deployment of American forces
and allows the United States to deter latent threats
from regional adversaries when portions of the force
are committed to important smaller scale operations.52
Although U.S. participation in smaller scale
contingency operations should not be viewed as a given,
if the National Command Authorities (NCA) decide to
commit U.S. forces to such operations, the strategy and
force structure, as sized by the two MRC requirement,
can adequately support that commitment.
Although there has been continuity throughout the
1990s concerning the use of the two MRC sizing
function, the current defense program, for the first
time, provides a great deal of specificity concerning
that requirement. The first component is the two
illustrative planning scenarios (IPS) developed to
assist planning and assessment. Each scenario examines
the performance of projected U.S. forces in relation to
critical parameters, including warning time, threat,
terrain, regional allies, and duration of
hostilities.53 These scenarios were not designed to
replicate the operational plans of the warfighting
CINCs, but rather to assess forces and support assets
for a wide range of possible future operations.54 In
addition to the MRC scenarios, the defense program has
also examined numerous smaller scale operations in
order to identify any unique force requirements not
specified in the two MRC warfight.
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A second component is a notional operational
scheme for the execution of an MRC. U.S. planning for
fighting and winning MRCs envisions an operational
strategy that in general unfolds as follows:
• halt the invasion
• build-up U.S. and allied combat power in theater
while reducing the enemy's
• decisively defeat the enemy
• provide for post-war stability55
The chart at the Appendix graphically shows the phases
for each MRC and indicates the planning aspects of
simultaneity. The BUR assumes approximately a 45-day
separation between the start of the first MRC and the
start of the second MRC.56
The final component is the MRC building block.
According to the 1996 DOD Annual Report, "the following
forces will be adequate, under most conditions, to
successfully fight and win a single MRC," assuming
continued progress on programmed force enhancements to
strategic lift, prepositioning, and other force
capabilities and their support assets:
• 5 Army divisions
• 4-5 Navy aircraft carrier battle groups
• Air Force fighter wing equivalents
• up to 100 bombers
• 1-2 Marine Expeditionary Forces
• Special Operations Forces57
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Principal Criticisms and Alternatives.

Criticisms. Several criticisms of the current
defense strategy have been raised over the past 3
years: the two MRC strategy is unrealistic because of
the low probability of occurrence; in the unlikely
event the United States is confronted by two MRCs, the
force structure is inadequate to the task; the
methodology is flawed; the defense program is
unaffordable--that it does not balance strategic
requirements with available resources.
Those who challenge the existence of the two MRC
requirement point to the absence of a two war
experience even during the height of the Cold War.
However, it is because the United States possessed
adequate military capability that it has been able to
deter multiple challenges. Sizing forces to meet only a
single contingency provides would-be adversaries the
opportunity to challenge American interests if that
single MRC force is committed elsewhere. The deterrent
value of a fully engaged single MRC force drops
precipitously, and, while not necessarily inviting
attack, it clearly passes the initiative into hands of
other hostile powers.58 The United States has routinely
deployed the flexible deterrent portion of the two MRC
force in this decade. Moreover, since 1953 America has
maintained at least the initial portion (deterrent
portion) of an MRC force in Korea. In 1994, while in
the process of reinforcing those forces in Korea in
response to the North Korean nuclear weapons crisis,
the United States sent the deterrent portion of the
second MRC force to Kuwait to deter a recalcitrant
Saddam Hussein. Since then, a similar deterrent package
has been dispatched several times to Kuwait. In each
case, the lack of a two MRC force might have entailed
the sacrifice of U.S. personnel or the compromise of
U.S. interests.59
There are also those that claim that two MRCs is
the right requirement, but that American force
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structure is inadequate. "By claiming to be able to do
what in fact it is unable to do," Harry Summers has
noted, "the United States is not only bluffing--a most
dangerous thing to do--but even worse, is kidding
itself into a false sense of security."60 Numerous
studies and assessments by OSD and the JCS, however, to
include the 1995 Nimble Dancer Exercises that
specifically assessed the capability to fight and win
two nearly simultaneous MRCs with the BUR force,
concluded that the force structure and programs that
constitute the BUR-based defense program remain
sufficient to execute the two MRC requirement. The
current DoD Annual Report claims that "U.S. forces
fighting alongside their regional allies are capable of
fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous major
regional conflicts today." The report goes on to state
that because of programmed enhancements and other key
technological improvements, U.S. military forces will
maintain and improve upon this capability.61 However,
even in the absence of adequate forces, seeking to
achieve the two MRC capability is central to credibly
deterring opportunism. "Such a force is the sine qua
non of a superpower," according to the QDR, "and is
essential to the credibility of our overall national
security strategy." Consequently, the two MRC
requirement must be pursued in order to avoid
undermining both deterrence and the credibility of U.S.
security commitments.62
A final criticism is the claim that the BUR and
its two MRC force create a fundamental mismatch since
the budget is insufficient to fund the force
adequately. The Congressional Budget Office in early
1995 estimated that the BUR was underfunded by about
$47 billion over the Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP). The Clinton administration has since provided
additional defense funding and argued that savings from
base closures and acquisition reform will alleviate any
remaining shortfall. Outsiders, however, still claim
substantial shortfalls.63 Given administration and
congressional pledges to balance the federal budget by
2002, further budget relief will not be forthcoming.
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The Pentagon recently announced QDR guidance that
assumes no upturn in defense funding over the next 5
years.64 In addition to the near-term funding problem,
Don Snider, in his defense "train wreck" thesis, argues
that only 32 percent of the funding is for future war
fighting capabilities and that this "investment
deficit" will derail the defense train in the future.
The large, expensive two MRC force precludes necessary
investments for responding to future threats.65
Alternatives to the Two MRC Requirement.
The alternatives can be grouped into two
categories with two variants each. The first is the
"lesser-included requirements" approach which has a
capabilities-based methodology branch, and a second
branch that focuses on peace operations. The other
category is the "technology" approach with a short-term
focus branch--airpower enthusiasts--and a long-term
focus branch--the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).

Lesser-included Requirements. The lesser-included
alternative consists of a theoretical branch and a
practical branch, and is based on the recent
experiences of the first decade of the post Cold-War
world. During that time the operational commitment of
U.S. armed forces has increased 300 percent, and the
vast majority of those deployments have been at the low
end of the spectrum of conflict--smaller-scale
contingencies, not MRCs. The theoretical branch is a
return to prominence of capabilities-based planning.
Proponents for this approach cite evidence that for the
past decade the United States has been responding to
asymmetrical challenges--"nontraditional" or
"unconventional combat" under strict rules of
engagement and that the MRC designed force is not
capable of efficiently and effectively executing these
types of missions.
Strategists no longer need a sizing function
upon which to base the size and structure of
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the military. They can now divorce themselves
from the threat-based logic of the Cold-War
and ask a more precise question: What set of
capabilities must American military forces
have to execute the full spectrum of
requirements dictated by our national
security strategy?66
There is, however, a false dichotomy here between
threat-based and capabilities-based planning.
Capabilities-based planning has not produced general
agreement on a set of core competencies that should be
granted priority in U.S. force structure and investment
decisions.67 In addition, the "lesser-included"
alternative has a certain degree of faddish relevance,
but it lacks a direct link to vital U.S. interests and
thus is not a fundamental requirement on which to base
force structure. A two MRC force based on robust
planning scenarios has the inherent flexibility to
accomplish a wide range of missions, whereas anything
less fails to provide the deterrent and warfighting
posture needed to protect vital U.S. interests.
The initial attempt at applying a capabilitiesbased perspective is the Baseline Engagement Force
(BEF), originally called the NOW Regional Contingency.
This Joint Staff concept would group all ongoing
contingency operations and overseas deployments into a
new framework, designed to highlight missions,
operations or deployments that siphon forces away from
the two MRC requirement.68 This concept may inform the
debate about personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) and
operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and possibly capture a few
unique requirements; however, given the independent
decisions that justify each contingency operation on
the basis of interest versus cost, the BEF does not
appear to represent a reasonable rationale on which to
base force requirements.
A more direct approach to the "lesser-included"
alternative is taken by several senior leaders who,
drawing on the same reference base of increased
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involvement in peace operations, have concluded that
the two MRC requirement should be adjusted to
specifically include force-sizing for peace operations.
The Air Force Chief of Staff, for example, favors a new
strategy with U.S. forces capable of winning one MRC
and a conflict requiring half those capabilities, with
enough left over to conduct two peacekeeping or
humanitarian operations. The one half MRC capability in
this strategy equates to airpower. Smaller-scale
operations, General Fogleman concludes, ought to be
equipped and focused on nonwarfighting missions.69
General George Joulwan, the former U.S. CINCEUR,
supports a similar approach. Claiming that six LRCs
(lesser regional contingencies) are more demanding than
two MRCs, and that LRCs represent a more likely use of
military forces, he believes that the United States
should be able to conduct a half-dozen LRCs at once.70
These approaches assume that U.S. participation in
peace operations is a given. But U.S. policy is very
specific on this issue. The NSS states that the "United
States must make highly disciplined choices about when
and under what circumstances to support or participate
in" peace operations, and that the "primary mission of
our Armed Forces is not peace operations; it is to
deter and, if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in
which our most important interests are threatened."71
Elsewhere, the President has clearly articulated the
priority for employment of U.S. forces: "If U.S.
participation in a peace operation were to interfere
with our basic military strategy, we would always place
our vital interest uppermost."72 Forces for LRCs are
provided from the pool of forces designed to fight two
MRCs; and operational experience in Somalia, Haiti,
Rwanda, and Bosnia indicates that adequate force
structure is available.73 The risk of not being able to
execute a 2nd MRC is greater than the risk of not
executing the 5th, 6th, or maybe even the 1st LRC.
The "lesser-included" theorists are correct in
noting the increased demand for lower-intensity
operations such as peace operations and humanitarian
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assistance. The United States, however, is not the only
recourse for such operations. U.N. peacekeeping
requirements have increased by orders of magnitude
since 1985. All told, 13 missions were begun between
1988 and 1992, equal to the number undertaken in the
previous 40 years of the U.N.'s existence. The majority
of these missions did not include direct U.S.
participation. To facilitate U.N. peacekeeping
operations in the future, numerous initiatives are
being pursued to create accessible military
capabilities: these include a Dutch-sponsored Rapid
Reaction Force; a Danish-led effort to establish a U.N.
Standby High Readiness Brigade; and a Canadiansponsored vanguard headquarters force. The United
States is also heavily involved in sponsoring
international peacekeeping forces. A prime example is
the Africa Crisis Response Force (ACRF), an all-African
10,000 man military force to intervene in that
continent's trouble spots. And the United States has
recently provided airlift assistance to reinforce
African peacekeepers in Liberia. Some of these
multilateral reaction forces may be contentious and not
result in deployable capabilities; however, the point
remains that U.S. military forces do not represent the
only capability to respond to future "asymmetrical"
challenges.74
Finally, if the National Command Authorities (NCA)
decide to commit U.S. forces to a peace operation, the
strategy and force structure, as sized by the two MRC
requirement, can adequately support that commitment.
There is no need to focus units specifically on these
types of operations. U.S. participation in Bosnia
provides an ideal case study from which to examine this
claim. The first point is to review the strategy and
associated operational considerations. Participation in
the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilization
Force (SFOR) does not seriously reduce the ability of
U.S. forces to fight and win an MRC elsewhere; however,
there could be delays in force closure and conflict
termination. The first priority is the most critical
phase in fighting and winning an MRC: the rapid
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deployment of forces to supplement indigenous and
forward deployed U.S. forces to halt the enemy invasion
during the opening days of the conflict. In general,
combat forces that might be engaged in peace operations
would not be among those sent during this critical
opening phase in an MRC. The combat elements involved
in Bosnia come from divisions other than those
designated a part of the contingency force. Therefore,
combat forces most needed in the opening phase of a
regional conflict would almost certainly still be
available to deploy on short notice from their home
stations.
From the outset, the current strategy recognizes
that U.S. military forces would not be able to conduct
sizable peace operations at the same time they are
fighting in two MRCs. Committed forces would have to
disengage and, if necessary, retrain so they could be
employed in higher priority operations in another
theater. As a consequence, were an MRC to occur, the
NCA would have to decide what steps to take to make
forces available for possible deployment to a second
theater. Options include discontinuing participation by
U.S. forces in Bosnia, relying on a smaller building
block of forces to deter aggression in regions where we
are concerned that a second MRC might occur, and,
possibly, backfilling active duty U.S. forces engaged
in peace operations with reserves.
There has also been a great deal of concern
expressed about so-called "high-demand, low-density"
(HD-LD) units that have experienced very high OPTEMPO
because of frequent deployments. These include Army
military police, engineers, Patriot crewman, civil
affairs, and port opening units, as well as Air Force
airlift crews and ground handling units. This is one
reason why a presidential callup of selected reserve
forces is required to support peace operations such as
Bosnia, Haiti, and even Rwanda. In addition to reserve
component units, assets from allied countries,
contractors, or the host nation can also meet HD-LD
requirements. Finally, to the extent that shortfalls
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exist that result in unacceptable OPTEMPOs, the
Services can adjust the internal mix of their force
structure. The Army examines this issue every 2 years
as part of its Total Army Analysis (TAA). The full
range of missions, from MRCs to LRCs to peace
operations, are evaluated to determine what combat
support and combat service support units are needed by
the force. Based on this analysis, unit structure is
shifted from less critical areas to other more
important ones deemed inadequate. The most recent TAA
(TAA-03) made adjustments to Active Component
capabilities in the high demand areas of port opening
units, transportation units, air defense units, and
theater communications support.75 The Army is also
adjusting the force mix in its Reserve Components to
ensure that critical support needs can be met. The
principal initiative is known as the Army National
Guard Redesign--a plan that would reorganize 11
National Guard combat brigades as combat support and
combat service support units.76 The Army has a great
deal of flexibility within its one million total force
end strength to organize units in accord with MRC and
smaller scale operations requirements.
To the extent that U.S. forces can assist in
peace operations, and if threats to more important
interests remain in check, the risk assessment of such
an operation would support U.S. participation. However,
as multilateral capabilities improve, U.S. commitments
will not be as necessary.

"Technology" Alternative. Proponents of technology
argue that by leveraging the emerging technologies of
long-range precision strike, or by waiting for even
better technology-driven capabilities of the future,
U.S. interests can be protected by a force posture much
different from that reflected in the BUR. Air power
enthusiasts claim that the two MRC framework fails to
take sufficient account of the revolution in airpower
and precision strike technology. The alternative, as
General Fogleman recommended, is to rely on a one-anda-half MRC force, with the one-half force consisting of
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airpower effective enough to halt any would-be
aggressor in a second contingency: two MRCs worth of
airpower and one MRC of land power. An added advantage
of this approach is that by focusing on capital
intensive forces, the United States would reduce the
requirement for manpower intensive ground units that
are highly exposed to casualties.77
Closely related to the airpower enthusiasts are
those who contend that the "revolution in military
affairs" (RMA) will have profound effects on the way
wars are fought. This model would replace the 2 MRC
force with a "silicon-based" superior force that would
be smaller and more flexible, emphasizing mobility,
speed, and agility. Warfighters would benefit from
technological achievements in stealth, precision
weapons, surveillance, and dominant battlefield
awareness. Most of the RMA crowd also contends that at
present the United States has a threat deficit and
therefore can afford to cut force structure and focus
on research and development of new "sunrise systems,"
experimentation, and innovation.78 Both variants of the
technology alternative posit a smaller and unbalanced
force structure to meet current and near-term
requirements. But as Mackubin Owens notes, "To pursue
exclusively the airpower or technology paths at the
expense of a robust, balanced force structure is to
invite strategic failure at some time in the future."79
Adjustments to the Two MRC Requirement.
Force planning has been and always will be a very
dynamic process. Consequently, as the strategic
environment changes or as the understanding of its
uncertainties matures, and as both threat and friendly
military capabilities evolve, there should be
adjustments to the defense program. Those adjustments,
however, should only be made within the framework of
the two MRC sizing function.

Planning Scenarios. The first adjustment is to
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reassess the planning scenarios used to size the two
MRC force. Critics of the two MRC framework claim that
the use of canonical scenarios (MRC-E and MRC-W)
suppress uncertainty and do not satisfactorily measure
the adequacy of U.S. force posture. Proposals include
using an expanded scenario set, to include nonstandard
scenarios, and examining the "scenario space" within
that set of scenarios to determine capability
envelopes.80 Scenario space implies the iteration of
numerous scenario characteristics, such as alternative
force levels (threat and friendly), buildup rates,
military strategies, and warning time, thereby
generating a range of required capabilities.
Nonetheless, the canonical scenarios--Korea and the
Persian Gulf--are clearly the most stressful and
dangerous near-term contingencies, and have served the
United States well by creating a requirement for highmobility forces and a diverse posture.81 But if finetuning military capabilities requires a broader look,
it may be appropriate to expand the scenario set and
use a scenario space concept to examine all relevant
factors. Adopting a scenario space concept should not
be construed as abandoning the fundamental importance
of MRC-based scenarios.
Reassessing the scenarios must also include
reexamining the threats used in the planning scenarios.
The Iraq and North Korean scenarios remain the most
demanding, but in each case, threat capability is
declining.82 In addition, the potential for opponents'
adopting asymmetrical strategies could pose different
security challenges than those currently contained in
the MRC planning scenarios. Iran's purchase of Kiloclass submarines and its improved antiship missiles is
one example. Finally, although the near-term
transformation of either Russia or China into "peer
competitors" appears even less likely today than it did
only a few years ago, planning scenarios should not
ignore the potential power of China.
These factors highlight the dynamic nature and the
importance of continuing to reassess potential threats
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to U.S. interests. Adopting the scenario space concept
should account for dynamic threat assessments.
Nevertheless, the United States should not lose sight
of the importance of maintaining robust and balanced
forces as well as the dangers and inefficiencies
associated with cyclical downsizing and rebuilding in
response to dynamic threat assessments.

Operational Concept. A second adjustment involves
the need to reexamine the operational concept for
fighting two nearly simultaneous MRCs. The real intent
of a two MRC force is not fighting two major wars at
once, but maintaining the ability to deter and defend
elsewhere, once one MRC force has been deployed.83
Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR, the American response to
threatening moves by Iraq in October 1994, demonstrated
the importance of focusing on "halt-phase," or
deterrent forces.84 If forces can be designed and
postured more appropriately in areas involving key
national interests, the United States may be able to
protect those interests and reassure allies more
effectively. The optimum posture involves not just
forces but also patterns of deployment, readiness, and
operations.85 An example of this approach is U.S.
Central Command's current reassessment of the mix of
forces forward deployed in the region to determine if a
better formulation would improve deterrence.
Focusing on rapidly deploying, or forward
stationing, "halt-phase" forces may be an effective
alternative if a full-blown two MRC force becomes
unaffordable. The recently released QDR emphasizes the
criticality of maintaining halt force capability to
seize the initiative in both theaters, and the Army
Chief of Staff argues that "success in future crises or
conflicts will be based on the ability to achieve
strategic preemption."86 As U.S. warfighting
capabilities have improved since the Gulf War, U.S. War
planners are placing far more emphasis on achieving
decisive results during the halt phase. The U.S.
military response during the halt phase is no longer
simply focused on stopping the enemy, but includes a
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campaign of aggressive engagement that would degrade
enemy capabilities at the start of an attack and reduce
the requirement for U.S. forces during the build-up
phase. Early decisive engagement requires the United
States to emphasize offensive air and missile strikes,
forward presence, and rapidly deployable offensive
strike forces.87
Furthermore, it is not clear why forces designed
for totally different regional scenarios have identical
operating (above-the-line) force requirements as
expressed in the basic MRC building block.88 A two MRC
force could consist of different building blocks, for
instance, one designed to reinforce a substantial
allied force presence, and the other designed as a
unilateral U.S. response in a more austere theater.
Operational innovations can also be considered for
routine overseas presence deployments. For example,
carrier battle group (CVBG) deployments can be reduced
by relying on the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF)
deployments and by recognizing the presence value of
Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG). Although originally
constituted to respond to carrier gaps in the Persian
Gulf, a routine application of the AEF concept could
result in fewer carrier requirements.89 Finally, in
addition to the 12 fleet carriers, the Navy has 12
large deck, VSTOL-capable, amphibious assault ships
that support routine ARG deployments and are as large
as any other navy's aircraft carriers. The CVBG's
traditional forward presence mission can be adequately
covered by a combination of CVBGs, AEFs, and ARGs,
allowing for resource savings.90
The nearly simultaneous characteristic of the two
MRC framework should also be reviewed as part of the
operational concept adjustment. This would include a
reexamination of the "win-hold-win" option. There was
nothing wrong, Richard Betts argues,
"with the 'win-hold-win' option. . . . The
notion that fighting a holding action in one
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theater until victory in another releases
forces for a counteroffensive is equivalent
to defeat was simply ridiculous. To plan
sequential rather than simultaneous campaigns
accords with the hallowed principle of
economy of force."91
Therefore, rather than focus on two nearly simultaneous
"win" forces, the United States should identify
multiple "halt-and-prevent" forces capable of quickly
compelling an offensive force to halt its attack short
of reaching critical theater objectives.92
Nevertheless, any reexamination of this issue must
recognize that the two MRC force posture has now gained
an important level of political significance with U.S.
allies and coalition partners. An extended "hold" for
the second MRC may cause allies to wonder who will be
left to fend for themselves while waiting for delayed
American reinforcements. Such a situation could result
not only in lost U.S. global influence, but in Allied
efforts to "renationalize" defense programs, leading to
regional arms races, and potentially the increased
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.93 Both
outcomes are undesirable and counterproductive to U.S.
interests. Consequently, adjusting the "simultaneity"
of the two MRCs should only be done with great caution
and within the context of a strong deter and halt force
for the second MRC.

Affordability. Secretary of Defense William Cohen
repeatedly indicated that the Quadrennial Defense
Review must be strategy-driven. The current National
Security Strategy points to the continued utility of a
two MRC force sizing function to generate the required
capabilities to shape the environment and reassure
friends, and deter and defeat potential aggressors. At
the same time, Secretary Cohen has also stressed the
importance of developing an adequate defense program
that lives within a constrained budgetary
environment.94 There are numerous initiatives that can
be pursued to ensure the affordability of a two MRC
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force.

Force Thinning. One concept that could generate
considerable savings is called force thinning. The
number of Army divisions, and Air Force squadrons, for
example, could remain the same, but combat systems and
the personnel manning those systems, particularly the
number of troops and civilians in support and
administrative functions, could be cut. Force-thinning
reductions are possible, in part, because of the coming
revolution in military affairs (RMA), in which smart
weapons, increased lethality, and situtational
awareness will allow for fewer platforms and fewer
personnel. Responding to the Army's digitization
efforts, for example, the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff
of the Army recently pointed out that the Army may be
able to reduce the manpower requirements of its 10
maneuver divisions and rely more on quality rather than
quantity.95 The digitization effort should also allow
the Army to modernize its cumbersome logistics and
supply systems and move to a smaller "transportationbased" logistics system.96 The other services are
equally sanguine. "It makes sense to me," the Air Force
Chief of Staff recently concluded, "if there is greatly
increased capability that we ought to be able to get by
with fewer of them [aircraft]."97 In this regard, the
GAO estimates that by the beginning of the next
century, the Air Force and Navy will require about 26
percent fewer flights to successfully hit their targets
because of increased munition accuracy. Therefore, the
number of indirect-fire and deep attack weapons systems
required to provide a given level of effectiveness can
be greatly reduced.98
Force-thinning efficiencies can also be gained by
redesigning and reducing the military's support
structure. The Defense Science Board estimated last
summer that $30 billion a year could be saved by
cutting excess infrastructure.99 U.S. military forces
can pack much greater potential into a smaller force
package with a smaller logistics tail.
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Modernization. Regarding modernization, BUR
resource levels have been criticized for underfunding
the procurement of new weapon systems. The JCS Chairman
and the service chiefs have been urging DOD to spend
$60 billion per year on procurement. The "modernization
squeeze" argument, however, fails to recognize the
importance and adequacy of R&D funding, and is based on
a false target driven by a dangerously out-of-balance
modernization program. According to Secretary Cohen,
the Pentagon's goal of spending $60 billion a year on
procurement is not sacrosanct and could change as a
result of the QDR, which may find that a smaller figure
is sufficient for weapons modernization.100
It is important to note that within the current
defense program those activities related to the
emerging RMA are funded and supported. All the Services
are very active in experimentation and innovation, as
demonstrated by the EXFOR division in the Army and the
formation of Battle Labs in all services. In addition,
R&D spending has not experienced the dramatic decreases
that have affected procurement accounts.101 In short,
the future military capability of the United States is
not in as great a peril as some pundits have predicted.
Nevertheless, the government must make some hard tradeoff decisions.
To begin with, the current modernization program
is heavily skewed toward a few high-cost, high-tech
aircraft systems having greatest utility in high
intensity conflicts, while at the same time the program
underfunds capabilities important for dominance across
the entire spectrum of conflict. As important as
airpower is to U.S. military effectiveness, its real
value is based on the synergistic application of all
elements of military power. In an MRC environment, for
instance, landpower is needed to reassure and reinforce
allies; to conduct a defense stout enough to compel
opponents to mass and offer inviting targets for U.S.
precision strike assets; to conduct counteroffensive
operations to achieve theater end-state conditions; and
to accomplish post hostilities operations. In addition,
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regional powers will be inclined to adopt asymmetrical
counters to the American style of warfare. Some of
these could include nonlinear battlefield tactics
designed to intermingle forces in order to make U.S.
targeting much more difficult, or fighting in urban
areas where the United States would have to limit its
use of precision weapons.102
Single-focused technology solutions to
modernization are also subject to catastrophic failure
on the battlefield if the opponent has developed
effective countermeasures. Concerning the new air and
missile delivered "silver-bullet," the sensor fuzed
weapon (SFW), a defense industry analyst recently
claimed that these weapons could be rendered useless by
very low-tech, low-cost jammers capable of defeating
both the munition's GPS and weapon control data
links.103 Therefore, as in the past, U.S. force
modernization efforts should maintain a balanced force
posture to guard against focused and asymmetrical
defense strategies and the emergence of niche
capabilities that could thwart U.S. precision
engagement effectiveness.
Conclusion.
Force planning, particularly when it is done
correctly, represents the purest application of the
strategic art--calculating a variable mix of ends,
ways, and means. In a world characterized by
uncertainty and regional instability, in which the
United States has security interests that are truly
global in scope, the ends are fairly clear although
difficult to achieve. The ways and means to achieve
those strategic ends continue to be expressed
appropriately by the two MRC framework. That framework
is founded on a logical integration of threat- and
capabilities-based planning and is flexible enough to
accommodate appropriate adjustments. New approaches to
planning scenarios and the operational concept offer
the potential for such adjustment concerning the "ways"
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of the strategic paradigm, while force thinning and
modernization are two important categories for
adjusting the affordability of the strategic "means."
The experience of more than 40 years of force
planning indicates that elements of both threat-based
and capabilities-based planning must be applied. This
is even more the case in periods of increased
uncertainty, as demonstrated by the Base Force and the
BUR. Figure 5 summarizes the force planning process and
illustrates the integration of threat-based and
capabilities-based planning.
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Drawing on the logic of threat-based planning, the
force planner needs realistic scenarios as a yardstick
against which to measure the capabilities of a force.
Adjusting the existing canonical-MRC scenarios by
adopting a scenario-space approach can better ensure
that all relative factors and resultant requirements
are considered. As shown in the center of Figure 5, the
focus of force planning should remain on the evaluation
of the MRC planning cases. The vast majority of force
requirements are derived from these primary cases.
However, it is also necessary to examine the full range
of missions directed by the National Security Strategy,
such as smaller scale contingencies (SSCs) and overseas
presence missions in order to ensure that all unique
force elements have been identified. Most of the U.S.
forces forward deployed constitute a deterrent posture
safeguarding areas of vital interest. Thus, in those
areas, these forces represent the initial crisis
response portion of the MRC force. Likewise, most of
the force structure elements required to execute and
sustain SSCs are derived from the two MRC force.
Nevertheless, in both cases there may be unique
requirements or higher demands for certain assets not
otherwise identified. Finally, resource constraints
must be applied to examine the internal characteristics
of the force posture and to build an affordable defense
program.
The two MRC framework provides the correct
planning focus to size and structure military forces
capable of accomplishing the full range of military
missions directed by the National Security Strategy in
this period of uncertainty and instability. The
resultant force is large and capable enough both to
deter regional opponents and win if so required,
particularly if appropriate adjustments are made in the
ways and means of the strategic framework. Moreover, an
outgrowth of the balanced two MRC force posture is its
inherent flexibility to respond to the full range of
smaller scale contingencies. Such a force posture
allows the synergistic application of military power
and prevents would be aggressors from gaining any low-
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tech, low-cost advantages.
In the end, it is the combination of threat and
capability-based planning in the two MRC force sizing
framework that will allow the United States to achieve
its strategic objectives as currently stated. The
proposed adjustments will make the process more
efficient and build a force that can meet diverse
future contingencies, while remaining affordable.
Commenting on the QDR, former Secretary of Defense
William Perry noted that in order to reassure our
friends and allies and protect vital interests, the
"two major regional conflicts is an existential
fact."104 Military and political leaders in the United
States must decide "how much is enough," and for the
time being, sizing forces to be capable of fighting and
winning two MRCs is the prudent and proper choice.
ENDNOTES
1. The MRC concept, as first defined in the Bush
administration, referred to major regional
contingencies. The BUR adjusted the term to major
regional conflicts. The 1996 National Security Strategy
uses both phrases with slightly greater emphasis on
contingency vs. conflict. The QDR replaced MRC with
MTW--major theater war. Only time will tell which
phrase will endure. This paper will stay with MRC and
the reader can choose to view that as either major
regional conflict or contingency.
2. Harlan Ullman, In Irons: U.S. Military Might in
the New Century, Washington, DC: National Defense
University, 1995, p. 111, identifies three related
"vital" questions for force planners: "What forces are
needed strategically and operationally?; What level of
capability and what types of force structure are
politically and economically sustainable and
justifiable . . . ?; and How do we safely, sensibly,
and affordably get from today's force structure and
capability to that of tomorrow and properly balance the
threat strategy, force structure, budget, and

40

infrastructure relationships?"
3. The Rand Corporation happens to be the
principal repository for detailed exposition on force
planning methodologies. Among the most recent works on
this subject, refer to the following: James A.
Winnefeld, The Post-Cold War Force-Sizing Debate:
Paradigms, Metaphors, and Disconnects, Santa Monica,
CA: Rand, 1992; Richard L. Kugler, U.S. Military
Strategy and Force Posture for the 21st Century:
Capabilities and Requirements, Santa Monica, CA: Rand,
1994; and Paul K. Davis, ed., New Challenges for
Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much is Enough, Santa
Monica, CA: Rand, 1994. In this last work, refer
particularly to "Part Two: Principles for Defense
Planning," pp. 15-132.
4. Winnefeld, p. 8.
5. Quoted in Russell F. Weigley, The American Way
of War: A History of United States Military Strategy
and Policy, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.,
1973, p. 380.
6. Millet and Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A
Military History of the United States of America, New
York: The Free Press, 1984, p. 496.
7. Ibid., pp. 511-512. See also, Kaufmann,
Planning Conventional Forces 1950-80, Washington, DC:
The Brookings Institution, 1982, p. 3. This requirement
is very similar to the Army's Strategic Mobility Plan,
first announced in 1991 as the Army's goal for the
Mobility Requirements Study.
8. For the Common Defense, pp. 530-535; and Henry
Kissinger, White House Years, Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1979. p. 220.
9. Paul K. Davis, "Planning Under Uncertainty Then
and Now: Paradigms Lost and Paradigms Emerging," in
Paul Davis, ed., New Challenges for Defense Planning:

41

Rethinking How Much is Enough, Santa Monica, CA: Rand,
1994, pp. 16-18. Also refer to Paul Davis and Lou
Finch, Defense Planning for the Post-Cold War Era,
Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1993, pp. 157-160, for a review
of this period. The referenced portion of the Defense
Planning Guidance (DPG) for conventional forces
employed in contingency operations reads like it comes
from the last two national military strategy documents.
10. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and
Vietnam, Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University
Press, 1986, p. 117.
11. William Kaufmann, Assessing the Base Force:
How Much is too Much?, Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution, 1992, p. 29.
12. Kissinger, p. 222.
13. DOD Annual Report 1976, Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 114.
14. Kaufmann, Planning Conventional Forces, pp.
26-27. Defense planning for Southwest Asia illustrates
how interconnected threat- and capabilities-based
planning are. Various threats to a vital national
interest (free flow of oil) are recognized, and the
United States decides to develop capabilities to
protect that interest. Some analysts consider this to
be a prime example of capabilities-based planning.
However, those capabilities are specifically sized and
postured against a range of fairly precise threatening
capabilities. Because it is a range of threats
(somewhat uncertain, but then again, most planners
recognize that even very specific scenarios are not
predictive), this is viewed as capabilities-based
planning. This points out the very thin line between
the two planning methodologies, particularly when it
comes to actually building the force, in this case the
RDJTF.
15. Ibid., pp. 27-28. See also Lorna S. Jaffe, The

42

Development of the Base Force 1989-1992, Washington,
DC: Joint History Office (OCJCS), July 1993, p. 4. For
a discussion of multifront conflicts, refer to Harold
Brown, Thinking About National Security, Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1983, pp. 178-182. Brown indicated that
it would be advantageous for the Soviets to conduct
diversionary operations in secondary theaters to
complicate U.S. and Allied planning. Such operations
would divert forces from the critical front--Central
Europe. U.S. recognition of this problem resulted in a
continuing focus on Europe.
16. DoD Annual Report to Congress 1984,
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
February 1, 1983, p. 191. This section of the report
details the plans and issues related to the development
of the RDF and CENTCOM. The planning force consisted of
4-2/3 division equivalents (Army and Marines) and 7
tactical fighter wings. The present day MRC building
block has a longer history than most people realize.
17. Kugler, p. 19.
18. Davis, "Planning Under Uncertainty," pp. 2829; and Davis and Finch, Defense Planning for the PostCold War Era, pp. 163-164. William Kaufmann offers a
similar conclusion in his Planning Conventional Forces
1950-80, p. 24:
Do these difficulties mean that conventional
force planning has been off on a wild goose
chase for the last twenty years? . . . In
fact, no one has yet devised a serious
planning substitute for (a) the development
and analysis of plausible but hypothetical
campaigns in specific theaters, (b) for the
determination of the forces needed to bring
about the desired military outcomes in those
specific theaters, and (c) difficult
judgments about the number of contingencies
for which U.S. conventional forces should be
prepared.

43

19. According to William Kaufmann and John
Steinbruner, Decisions for Defense: Prospects for a New
World Order, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,
1991, p. 6: ". . . most presidents, . . . have been
willing to bet that if the forces to cover the most
threatening contingencies could be acquired and
maintained at acceptable cost, they could divert enough
of these forces to handle lesser cases without undue
risk."
20. Les Aspin, "National Security in the 1990s:
Defining a New Basis for U.S. Military Forces," speech
given to the Atlantic Council, January 6, 1992, pp. 12.
21. See Geoffrey Kemp, "Regional Security, Arms
Control, and the End of the Cold War," The Washington
Quarterly, Autumn 1990, for a discussion of the
implications of the shift away from a bipolar world and
the dynamic factors contributing to greater risks from
regional conflicts. The nature of regional threats is
now widely established and accepted. Refer to the
National Security Strategy 1996, The National Military
Strategy 1995, and the DOD Annual Report 1996.
22. National Security Strategy of the United
States, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, March 1990, p. 6.
23. In the 1996 DOD Annual Report, Secretary Perry
recognizes that these regional conflicts do not
directly threaten the survival of the United States,
but do threaten our allies and our vital interests.
William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and
the Congress, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, March 1996, p. vii. Hereafter referred to as
the DOD Annual Report 96.
24. National Defense University, Strategic
Assessment 1996, Washington, DC: National Defense
University Press, 1996, p. 8. One of the goals of our

44

National Security Strategy is to promote prosperity at
home, or as the President indicates in his preface "to
bolster America's economic revitalization." A National
Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
February 1996, p. 1. (Hereafter referred to as NSS 96.)
Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1993, p.
10. (Hereafter referred to as the BUR.) The President's
DOD budget request for FY 1997 represented a 6 percent
cut from the previous year, and the requested FY 1997
DOD budget authority was, in real terms, 40 percent
below FY 1985, the peak year for inflation-adjusted
budget authority since the Korean War. As a share of
America's gross domestic product, DOD outlays are
expected to fall to 3.2 percent in FY 1997, well below
any time since before World War II. DOD Annual Report
96, 1996, pp. 251-256.
25. As mentioned in the text, this was a closehold process, at least initially until the structure
and critical decisions were in place. Only afterwards
did the details of the deliberations leading to the
Base Force become public. By far the single best source
is Jaffe, The Development of the Base Force: 1989-1992.
26. Jaffe, p. 25. General Powell reveals in his
autobiography, My American Journey, an interesting
incident related to the budgetary implications of his
desired force. Based on an interview he had given, The
Washington Post reported on May 7, 1990, that "the
nation's top military officer predicted a restructured
military could lead to a 25 percent lower defense
budget." Powell goes on to relate that at the time
Secretary Cheney had publicly proposed cutting the
Pentagon budget, but by only 2 percent a year over the
next 6 years. Powell and Cheney's frank discussion
closes out this story. Collin Powell, My American
Journey, New York: Ballentine Books, 1995, pp. 441-442.
27. Quoted in Kaufmann, Decisions for Defense, p.
45.

45

28. Kugler, U.S. Military Strategy and Force
Posture, p. 35.
29. Report of the Secretary of Defense to the
President and the Congress, Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, January 1991, p. 4; and
National Military Strategy of the United States,
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
January 1992, pp. 19-24 (hereafter referred to as the
NMS 92).
30. Les Aspin, National Security in the 1990s:
Defining a New Basis for U.S. Military Forces, before
the Atlantic Council of the United States, January 6,
1992, pp. 5-6.
31. Les Aspin, An Approach to Sizing American
Conventional Forces For the Post-Soviet Era, February
25, 1992.
32. Colin L. Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges
Ahead," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/93, Vol. 71, No.
5, p. 41. See also Powell, My American Journey, p. 438.
33. Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President
and the Congress, Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, February 1992, p. 8.
34. NMS 92, p. 11.
35. "The Army Base Force--Not a Smaller Cold War
Army," discussion paper from the Department of the
Army's War Plans Division, dated February 1992. See
also Kaufmann and Steinbruner, Decisions for Defense,
p. 27. The authors make the following point:
How many contingencies might occur
simultaneously, and in how many separate
theaters the United States should be prepared
to become engaged at any one time, was not
made clear. However, the assumption appears

46

to be that the Pentagon should have the
capability to deal with at least two major
regional contingencies . . .
36. Powell, My American Journey, p. 564.
37. BUR: methodology, p.4; missions, p. 13; force
sizing, p. 7. No other administration has provided the
degree of transparency in its force planning
deliberations as represented by the BUR. The detailed
wargaming analysis done by J-8 is not presented for
obvious reasons in an unclassified publication.
Nonetheless, contrast this with the history of the Base
Force (Jaffe), which was not published until at least 2
years after the fact.
38. Richard Kugler, Toward a Dangerous World,
Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1995, pp. 212-213. According to
General Powell: "It took us 9 months to finish the BUR,
and we ended up again with a defense based on the need
to fight two regional wars, the Bush strategy, but with
Clinton campaign cuts." My American Journey, p. 564.
39. David Ochmanek, "Planning Under Uncertainty: A
User's Guide to the Post-Cold War World," Santa Monica,
CA: Rand, unpublished paper, September 19, 1995, p. 15.
40. Kugler, U.S. Military Strategy and Force
Posture, p. 185.
41. William S. Cohen, Quadrennial Defense Review:
The Secretary's Message, Internet,
http://www.dtic.mil/defenselink/topstory/qdr/msg. html,
May 19, 1997, p. 2. (Hereafter referred to as QDR.)
42. Ibid., p. 3.
43. NSS 96, p. 23.
44. DOD Annual Report 96, p. 5. For a spirited
defense of the Bottom Up Review and its associated
defense program, refer to the response by Dr. Edward L.

47

Warner, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and
Requirements, contained in U.S. General Accounting
Office, Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of Key DOD
Assumptions, Report no. 95-96, January 1995, pp. 46-65.
45. DOD Annual Report 96, pp. vii-viii.
46. Ibid., p. 5. See also NSS 96, p. 4, and NMS
95, p. ii.
47. DOD Annual Report 96, p. 14.
48. BUR, p. 7. This point is also made in NSS 96,
p. 14, and in the DOD Annual Report 96, p. 5. General
Collin Powell's 1992 NMS presents the same rationale:
Our strategy also recognizes that when the
United States is responding to one
substantial regional crisis, potential
aggressors in other areas may be tempted to
take advantage of our preoccupation. Thus, we
can not reduce forces to a level which would
leave us or our allies vulnerable elsewhere.
49. Winnefeld, p. 18.
50. This point is made
where it refers to the "two
Annual Report 96, p. 5. The
argument as a hedge against

in both the NSS 96, p. 14,
war" force, and in the DOD
BUR, p. 19, refers to this
an uncertain future:

. . . it is difficult to predict precisely
what threats we will confront ten to twenty
years from now. In this dynamic and
unpredictable post-Cold War world, we must
maintain the military capabilities that are
flexible and sufficient to cope with
unforeseen threats.
51. General John M. Shalikashvili, CJCS Written
Statement to Congress, March 1996, p. 18.

48

52. Edward L. Warner, III, "The Coming Defense
Train Wreck," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 1,
Winter 1996, p. 121. Warner was responding to the
criticism of the Administration's defense program.
53. The "use of plausible, illustrative scenarios
against postulated threat forces enables comparisons
and analyses to determine the relative values of
different forces and capabilities across a range of
circumstances," NMS 95, p. 17. The illustrative
planning scenarios depict aggression by a remilitarized
Iraq against Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and by North
Korea against the Republic of Korea. Refer to the BUR,
pp. 13-15, for a good discussion of the planning
scenarios used to develop the BUR force. This
discussion addresses most of the common criticisms
raised against using these particular scenarios. Robert
Haffa, Jr., "A New Look at the Bottom-Up Review:
Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces for a New
Century," Strategic Review, Vol. 24, No. 1, Winter
1996, p. 24, argues that the "work contained in the BUR
was very much an extension of the scenario-driven
methodology that, for the most part, has guided the
planning of U.S. conventional forces since the 1960s. .
. ." He goes on to state that the "most dangerous nearterm contingencies--Korea and the Gulf . . . are among
the more stressful to plan against."
54. U.S. Government Accounting Office, Bottom-Up
Review: Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions, January 1995,
pp. 61-64, argued that the scenarios differed from
current war planning assumptions of the CINCs. The DOD
response pointed out the differences between
illustrative planning/programming scenarios and CINC
war plans. The major difference is that the CINCs are
concerned with the present, and the illustrative
planning scenarios focus on the future.
55. DOD Annual Report 96, p. 5. For a more indepth discussion of the operational phases, refer to
BUR, pp. 15-17.

49

56. From an unclassified DOD briefing entitled
"U.S. Defense Strategy and the Bottom-Up Review,"
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Strategy
and Requirements, March 1995.
57. DOD Annual Report 96, p. 12. The report goes
on to state that in the event of unforeseen
circumstances, such as a failed initial defensive
effort, more forces could be committed. These
additional forces would come principally from the
reserves. Also refer to the BUR, pp. 18-23. The BUR
identified several specialized high-leverage units that
might be "dual-tasked," that is, used in both MRCs,
such as B-2s, F-117s, JSTARs, and other C4I assets. It
is worth noting that the MRC building block has
remained constant over the past 4 years, with the
exception of Army divisions. The original building
block specified 4-5 Army divisions. That has been
adjusted to 5 Army divisions in the most recent DOD
Annual Report. The MRC building block receives mixed
coverage in the QDR. On the one hand, the report claims
that "the forces and capabilities required to uphold
this two-theater element of the strategy will differ
from the Major Regional Conflict building blocks
developed in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review." Later,
however, concerning the requirements for major theater
war, the report concludes that a "force of the size and
structure close to the current force was necessary."
The QDR goes on to claim that a larger force is needed
in response to enemy use of chemical weapons or shorter
warning times. Finally, the recommended force structure
is virtually the same as the BUR force. QDR, Section
III, p. 9; Section IV, p. 7; and Section V, p. 3.
58. MG Edward B. Atkeson, (USA, Ret), "The Threat
From Washington," Army Magazine, Vol. 46, No. 7, July
1996, p. 13.
59. The classic defense of this requirement was
presented by Secretary Perry in a letter to the New
York Times in February 1995. Perry concluded that ". .
. deterrence worked because the United States had a

50

ready force and was prepared to use [it] . . . The
United States strategy to maintain a force that can
fight two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts
is designed to prevent just this type of adventurism."
William J. Perry, "What Readiness to Fight Two Wars
Means," The New York Times, February 16, 1995, p. A26.
This argument has been repeated in the Secretary's 1996
Annual Report as well as the current NSS.
60. COL Harry G. Summers, Jr. (Ret.), The New
World Strategy: A Military Policy for America's Future,
New York: Touchstone Book, 1995, p. 153. In addition,
former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, when
questioned about our capability to support the two MRC
requirement, indicated that he supported the
requirement but was concerned that we lacked the
requisite logistics capabilities. "About Fighting and
Winning Wars: An Interview with Dick Cheney,"
Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, May 1996, p. 32.
61. DOD Annual Report 1997, Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, April 1997, p. 6. See also,
DOD Annual Report 96, p. 12. In addition to the Nimble
Dancer Wargame, the other studies include the Mobility
Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update (MRS BURU),
which examined mobility forces, and the Intelligence
Bottom-Up Review (IBUR).
62. QDR, Section III, p. 8.
63. Haffa, p. 23.
64. "Future Forces to be Built on Idea that
Budgets Stay Level," Army Times, December 23, 1996, p.
3.
65. Snider, pp. 91-92.
66. James Dubik, "The New Logic: The US Needs
Capability-Based, Not Threat-Based Military Forces,"
Armed Forces Journal International, Vol. 134, No. 6,
January 1997, pp. 42-44. The CSA agrees that the Army

51

"should instead focus on how we can become a
capabilities-based force able to provide stability to
the world's hot spots." General Reimer's main concern
about the two MRC strategy is that it does not allow
for contingency and peacekeeping operations in Haiti,
Somalia and Bosnia. "Reimer: Two MRC Strategy Should be
Retained but Refined," Defense Daily, January 17, 1997,
p. 84.
67. Haffa, p. 22.
68. "U.S. Military Seeks to Dodge Force Cuts,"
Defense News, Vol. 11, No. 40, October 7-13, 1996, pp.
1, 34.
69. Quoted in "General Predicts High Priority for
U.S. Peace-keeping," Washington Times, January 8, 1997,
p. 4.
70. As quoted in "Are U.S. Forces Structured
Right?," Navy Times, March 25, 1996, p. 27.
71. NSS 96, p. 23.
72. A Time For Peace: Promoting Peace: The Policy
of the United States, Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, February 1995, p. 15. The new
Secretary of Defense has also taken a hard line on
curtailing U.S. participation in peace operations.
I believe we should not be the world's
policeman. We have to be much more selective,
much more restrained in utilizing our men and
women and committing them to areas which are
going to serve to drain what needs to be done
as far as keeping our readiness up and also
funding our modernization account.
Quoted in "Pentagon Chief Faces Critics in Arguing
Military's Budget," New York Times, February 13, 1997,
p. B10.

52

73. Proposals to create units designed to conduct
what the Army calls "stability operations," such as
peacekeeping, peace enforcement and disaster relief,
have coincided with a significant increase in the
number of noncombat missions the Army has been called
on to conduct. Army leaders, to include the CSA, are
convinced that the present force structure can cope
with the demands of stability operations without
dedicating any units to concentrate on such missions
exclusively. "The Army takes its performance [in
Bosnia], and the performance in Mogadishu and other
places as confirmation that our force structure is
about right and that we can do full spectrum
operations." "Flexibility Key to 'Stability
Operations'," Army Times, August 12, 1996, p. 20.
74. "Clinton Administration Revamps Plans for
Trouble-Shooting All-African Force," The Washington
Post, February 9, 1997, p. 28; and "U.S. Planes will
Airlift African Peacekeepers," Washington Times,
February 12, 1997, p. 8. See also "It's Time for a
Standing UN Rapid Reaction Force," International Herald
Tribune, January 22, 1997, p. 9; and William J. Durch,
ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, London:
Macmillan Press, 1994, p. 9.
75. "Army Leadership Reviews Options for Filing
Shortfalls in Support Units," Inside the Army, October
6, 1995, p. 1.
76. "Reimer: National Guard Redesign," Inside the
Pentagon, March 14, 1996, p. 1. The issue of excess
reserve structure was raised in the Commission on Roles
and Missions, Directions for Defense: Report of the
Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces,
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May
24, 1995, pp. 2-24 and 2-25.
77. Edward N. Luttwak, "A Post-Heroic Military
Policy," Foreign Affairs, July/August 1996, Vol. 75,
No. 4. Because of funding problems, air-power
enthusiasts also recognize that the two MRC framework

53

threatens the health of major tactical air
modernization plans.
78. See Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., "Keeping Pace
with the Military-Technological Revolution," Science
and Technology, Summer 1994, pp. 23-29.
79. Mackubin T. Owens, "How to Think About the
Quadrennial Defense Review," Strategic Review, Winter
1997, p. 6.
80. Davis, "Institutionalizing Planning for
Adaptiveness," New Challenges for Defense Planning, pp.
81-84. See also Davis and Finch, Defense Planning for
the Post Cold-War Era, pp. 43-52; Kugler, Toward a
Dangerous World, p. 270; and Paul K. Davis, David
Gompert and Richard Kugler, Adaptiveness in National
Defense: The Basis of a New Framework, Issue Paper,
National Defense Research Institute, August 1996.
81. Kugler, Toward a Dangerous World, p. 258.
82. Anthony Cordesman, author of a recent study on
Iraqi military capabilities, states that, "The Iraqi
military is in an accelerating decline that has picked
up since 1994." "Sanctions, Not Missiles, Sap Iraq,"
Defense News, Vol. 11, No. 36, September 9-15, 1996, p.
4. Concerning Korea, The Washington Times reports:
"North Korea's military forces have suffered a steady
decline in capability that has shifted the balance of
power in favor of South Korea." "North Korea's Slide
Ends Military Edge," Washington Times, December 13,
1996, p. 18. In addition refer to "Dim Prospects Seen
for N. Korean Regime," The Washington Post, August 10,
1996, p. A24; and "N. Korea Called Top U.S. Threat,"
Washington Times, February 6, 1997, p. 6.
83. Kugler, Toward a More Dangerous World, p. 271.
84. The NSS recognizes this issue when it cites
U.S. performance in Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR:

54

. . . we must have forces that can deploy
quickly and supplement U.S. forward-based and
forward-deployed forces, along with regional
allies, in halting an invasion and defeating
the aggressor, just as we demonstrated by our
rapid response in October 1994 when Iraq
threatened aggression against Kuwait.

NSS 96, p. 14.
85. Davis, Gompert, and Kugler, p. 1.
86. QDR, Section III, p. 8. See also Colin Clark,
"Cut DOD Agencies, Not Army Troops: Army Chief to
Cohen," Defense Week, April 28, 1997, p. 8. In
addition, according to Michael O'Hanlon,
Military planning should focus on reinforcing
this desirable state of deterrence and, if
necessary, waging combat operations early in
the course of a conflict, rather than
planning to retake lost territory with larger
forces later on.

Defense Planning for the Late 1990s: Beyond the Dessert
Storm Framework, Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institute, 1995, p. 30. In this monograph, O'Hanlon
presents a well-reasoned argument for a force structure
capable of executing one DESERT SHIELD and one DESERT
STORM.
87. Anthony H. Cordesman, U.S. Forces in the
Middle East, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997, pp. 4748.
88. Don M. Snider, "The Coming Defense Train Wreck
. . .," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 1,
Winter 1996, p. 94. As Richard Haffa states, ". . .
it's not the canonical scenarios that take us down the
wrong force planning path, it's planning to fight them
in canonical ways."

55

89. "U.S. May Raise Presence in Gulf," Defense
News, November 25-December 1, 1996, pp. 1, 20.
90.
patterns
response
fleet of

Michael O'Hanlon argues that operational
can be changed substantially and that crisis
and warfighting requirements can be met by a
only eight carriers. O'Hanlon, p. 85.

91. Richard K. Betts, ". . . And What to Do About
It," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 1, Winter
1996, pp. 104-105.
92. For a discussion of the potential
characteristics of a "halt-and-prevent" force, see
Zalmay Khalilzad and David Ochmanek, "Rethinking US
Defense Planning," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 1, Spring
1997, pp. 61-62.
93. General Powell noted one disadvantage of
adopting the win-hold-win approach:
Aspin floated the idea of a force premised on
our fighting one major conflict and a holding
action against any other enemy until we could
finish the first fight. Our South Korean
allies immediately asked if they were the
ones who might be left "on hold." Aspin's
trial balloon popped.
Powell, My American Journey, p. 564.
94. "Secy. Cohen sets the ground rules," The Army
Times, March 17, 1997, p. 3. Fred Hiatt argues that the
review has been strategy-based, not budget-based, "as
long as you understand that no strategy was allowed
into consideration if it cost more than about $270
billion per year." Fred Hiatt, "Defense: If Only They'd
Debate," The Washington Post, May 13, 1997, p. 17.
95. "Reimer: Army Divisions More Lethal, Capable
Than Five Years Ago," Defense Daily, March 5, 1997, p.
340. An example of improved capabilities in tactical

56

air platforms is provided by McDonnell Douglas
Helicopter Systems in their discussion of the D model
Apache Longbow. Prototypes had 400 percent greater
lethality; 720 percent higher survivability; greater
situational awareness; and improved reliability,
availability and maintainability. "AH-64D Longbow
Apache," Army, Vol. 47, No.1, January 1997, p. 22.
96. Interview with General Reimer, Jane's Defence
Weekly, February 19, 1997, p. 32.
97. As quoted in "Fogleman: New Technology May
Allow Smaller Force Structure," Defense Daily, February
16, 1996, p. 243.
98. U.S. Government Accounting Office, Combat Air
Power: Reassessing Plans to Modernize Interdiction
Capabilities Could Save Billions, Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Accounting Office, December 1995, p. 8. For
a recent example, a innovative concept called
"Revolution in Strike Warfare" will allow a CVBG to
generate as many as 800 sorties a day in the first 96
hours of a campaign; a boost from the traditional 250
sorties a day. "U.S. Navy Concept May Triple Sortie
Capability," Defense News, January 20-26, 1997, p. 8.
If the increased sortie generation from each carrier is
combined with the increased lethality of each sortie,
the United States ought to be able to reduce overall
capacity. According to Rear Admiral Dennis McGinn,
Director of Air Warfare, "It is not a question of how
many sorties it takes to destroy a target, but how many
targets each sortie can destroy." For a detailed
discussion of the dramatic increase in airpower
effectiveness when armed with smart anti-armor
submunitions--the Sensor Fuzed Weapon--refer to
Christopher Bowie, et al., The New Calculus: Analyzing
Airpower's Changing Role in Joint Theater Campaigns,
Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1993.
99. Charles Robb, "Be Ready for Two Desert
Storms," The Washington Post, January 15, 1997, p. 19.

57

100. "Cohen Says $60 Billion Procurement Goal May
Shrink," Defense Daily, February 27, 1997, p. 303.
101. In current dollars, DOD R&D funding has been
relatively consistent for the past decade and has only
declined 5 percent over the past 3 years, compared to a
18 percent decrease for procurement. DOD Annual Report
96, p. B-1.
102. There is a body of work on lessons learned
from DESERT STORM that addresses the possible
asymmetrical responses of future opponents. The single
best source is Patrick J. Garrity, Why the Gulf War
Still Matters: Foreign Perspectives on the War and the
Future of International Security, Los Alamos: Center
for National Security Studies, Report No. 16, July
1993. In addition, refer to Bennett, Gardiner, and Fox,
"Not Merely Planning for the Last War," in Davis, New
Challenges for Defense Planning, pp. 477-514.
103. John G. Roos, "A Pair of Achilles' Heels: How
Vulnerable to Jamming are US Precision-Strike
Weapons?," Armed Forces Journal International, Vol.
132, No. 4, November 1994, pp. 21-23. Furthermore, the
Israeli Defense Force expects that by the end of this
decade tanks will be equipped with "smart" active
countermeasure systems against both horizontal and
vertical top attacks. Garrity, p. 61.
104. "Interview with Defense Secretary William J.
Perry," Army Times, January 6, 1997, p. 18.

58

APPENDIX

If a major regional conflict erupts, the United
States will deploy a substantial number of forces to
the theater to augment those already there in order to
quickly defeat the aggressor. If it is prudent to do
so, limited U.S. forces may remain engaged in a
smaller-scale operation, such as a peacekeeping
operation, while the MRC is ongoing; if not, U.S.
forces will be withdrawn from contingency operations in
order to help constitute sufficient forces to deter
and, if necessary, fight and win a second MRC.
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If a second MRC were to break out shortly after the
first, U.S. forces would deploy rapidly to halt the
invading force as quickly as possible. Selected highleverage and mobile intelligence, command and control,
and air capabilities, as well as amphibious forces,
would be redeployed from the first MRC to the second as
circumstances permitted. After winning both MRCs, U.S.
forces would assume a more routine peacetime posture.
Source: DoD Annual Report 1996; and OASD briefing,
"U.S. Defense Strategy and the BUR," March 1995.
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